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Ensuring Effective Enforcement Mechanisms of 
Data Protection in the Future EU-US Agreement 
on Data Protection 
 
Thank you for the invitation to this public hearing. It is for me an honour and of great 
interest to discuss the complex matter of the future EU-US data protection agreement 
in criminal matters. The perspective of a General Data Protection Transatlantic 
Agreement aiming at strengthening the EU-US cooperation in criminal matters raises 
many issues, from an external observer point of view. These can unfortunately not 
extensively be all dealt with today. Let’s however discuss them. 
 
If the EU-US High Level Contact Group (HLCG) Final Report on information sharing 
and privacy and personal data protection appears to constitute a basis for future 
negotiations, it must be said that it does not address a range of crucial issues (many 
of which have been identified by the European Data Protection Supervisor in its 
opinion of 11 November 2008). Whether these issues have been the object of 
informal debates have not been made public. This makes it difficult for observers to 
build useful comments on what has or has not already been done. In order to have 
a proper public debate on such a sensitive issue, documents must be made 
publicly available. 
 
The Study1 conducted by Rocco Bellanova and Paul De Hert on request of the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
addresses in further detail important incompatibility points between the EU and the 
US data protection regimes.  
 
Among the main concerns raised by experts is application of the purpose limitation 
principle, which entails different implications in particular with respect of the concept 
of further use for “compatible purpose”. In the US, the application of the so-called 
“routine use” allowing inter-agencies transfers of data has shown strong 
discrepancies with the European conception of “compatible” purposes. However, it 
must be highlighted that even on the European side, there is a trend to extend the 
meaning of compatible purposes. The principle of interoperability, along with the 
increasing use of personal data primary collected for commercial purposes and 
further used for law enforcement (Data retention Directive, future PNR European 
system) are some of the illustrations that the purpose limitation principle is also highly 
under pressure in the European data protection system2.  
 
A second major issue relates to the retention periods in the US. At worst, these are 
not regulated at all. At best, these are extensively long. This matter should be 
addressed in the specific agreements on the exchange of personal data.  
 
I would now address some of other issues that have insufficiently been dealt with by 
the EU-US HLCG, focussing mainly on the enforcement mechanisms of data 
protection principles.  
 
  
I. The adequacy, a European requirement, but also a method, 
entailing core data protection principles and objectives 
 
My first point is that, though the EU is not bound by the adequacy requirement  in the 
framework of such an agreement on the protection of personal data, the EU should  
nevertheless be consistent with the adequacy as a method. 
 
I share the view of the EDPS that strongly recommends that adequacy should be the 
grid analysis to follow when assessing the level of protection of personal data 
provided in the general Agreement. The adequacy requirement is a core principle of 
European data protection in the matter of trans-border data flows. It is provided in the 
Additional Protocol 181 to the European Convention 108 – to which 19 Member 
States are nowadays bound –, in the European Data Protection Directive 95/46, in 
the Europol and Eurojust conventions and in the Framework decision on the 
protection of personal data in the former third pillar matters. Though none of these 
instruments legally require an adequacy assessment in the framework of a EU-third 
country agreement on the protection of personal data, adequacy should nevertheless 
be referred to as the assessment tool, since it allows ensuring consistency in the 
                                                
1 BELLANOVA, Rocco, DE HERT, Paul, “Data Protection From a Transatlantic Perspective: the EU and US Move 
Toward a EU-US Data Protection Agreement?”, Study Requested by the LIBE Committee, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 2008  
2 See DUMORTIER, F., GAYREL, C., JOURET, J., MOREAU, D., POULLET., Y., “La protection des données 
personnelles dans l’Espace européen de liberté, de sécurité et de justice”, Journal de Droit Européen, n°166, 
February 2010 
European trans-border data flow policy. Rather than a requirement, adequacy should 
be used here as a method, entailing core principles and objectives. The grid provided 
by the Working Party 29 in its Working Paper 12, has now been well experienced in 
the first pillar. It is mostly inspired from the European Convention 108, which provides 
the core data protection principles applicable in every member States. A similar grid 
analysis must be adapted with respect to trans-border data flows and the protection 
of personal data in criminal matters in order to delineate the standards of protection 
that the EU is expecting from its partners.  
 
The perspective of a general EU-US data protection Agreement in the new 
constitutional context of the Lisbon Treaty provides the opportunity for the EU to 
break with the current presumption of adequacy surrounding every EU-US 
Agreements in criminal matters. Indeed, neither Europol, nor Eurojust has found 
relevant to assess the protection offered by the US, though these agencies are 
required to do so and have done so in their other agreements with third states. The 
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement has also put aside the adequacy method. It is 
time to break with EU-US custom-made Agreements in this matter. The progressive 
development of an adequacy presumption with regard to the US Data 
protection system in criminal matters undermines the EU’s data protection 
policy aiming at building adequacy bridges with other third countries. It is even 
more important since the adequacy experience in the first pillar has shown that third 
states aiming at being considered as providing an adequate level of protection often 
take inspiration from legislations of other third states that have been considered 
adequate by the EU. An inadequate level of protection in the EU-US Agreement 
could be considered by other third states as a precedent, which would in turn puts in 
difficulty the EU when requiring a higher level of protection from other states. 
Consistency in this matter is fundamental and adequacy is the relevant tool.  
 
 
II. The adequacy method: the relevant and necessary tool as 
to the assessment of enforcement mechanisms 
 
This previous recommendation leads me to the second point of my presentation: the 
adequacy method is the relevant tool as to the assessment of enforcement 
mechanisms which are at the heart of the objectives of any data protection 
legislations. 
 
These objectives have been identified by the Working Party 29 as follows: a) to 
deliver a high level of compliance with the rules (implying the existence of systems of 
verification by independent authorities); b) to provide support and help to data 
subjects in the exercise of their rights and; c) to provide appropriate redress to the 
injured party when rules are not complied with.3  
 
a) Providing a high level of compliance with the rules 
 
As has been underscored by the Working Party 29, “no system can guarantee a 
hundred percent compliance, but some are better than others. A good system is 
                                                
3 Working Document 12 of the Working Party 29 relating to “Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: 
Applying Article 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive” of 24 July 1998.  
generally characterised by a high degree of awareness among data controllers of 
their obligations, and among data subjects of their rights and the means of exercising 
them. The existence of effective and dissuasive sanctions can play an important 
role in ensuring respect for rules, as of course can systems of direct verification by 
authorities, auditors, or independent data protection officials”.   
 
As far as the first objective is concerned, issues are raised as to the difference of 
approaches of independent data protection authorities in the US and in the EU. It 
appears that US Privacy agencies (Department of Homeland Security Office, the 
President’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Oversight Board among others) are actually 
advisory bodies and cannot be considered as structurally independent when 
compared to EU Data Protection Authorities. However, structural independence, with 
the exception of the judiciary power, is rarely admissible and/or constitutionally 
possible in many legal systems. The experience of the adequacy requirement on this 
point in first pillar decisions shows that some countries have been considered as 
providing an adequate level of protection, though the Data Protection Authorities 
established in such countries were not “structurally” independent4. Instead, 
independence requires an assessment as a whole and must be sought in a wide 
range of guarantees: the financial resources of the DPA, mode of allocation of these 
financial resources (is there a financial independence?), guarantees as to the 
independence of the members (rules applying to the nomination and termination 
members’ mandate, incompatibility regimes, professional secrecy rules), assessment 
of the functional independence (is there an effective staff? Are the right competences 
gathered?), and of course in the normative, investigation and sanctions powers of the 
DPA. These are examples of guarantees that may counterbalance, if rightly applied, 
the lack of structural independence. US proposals aiming at satisfy the independence 
criterion must therefore cover all these aspects in order to reach a reasonable 
compromise.  
 
b) Providing support and help to data subjects in the exercise of 
their rights 
 
As far as the second objective is concerned, the Working Party 29 has stated that 
“The individual must be able to enforce his/her rights rapidly and effectively, and  
without prohibitive cost.  To do so there must be some sort of institutional mechanism  
allowing independent investigation of complaints.”  
 
This objective must be at the heart of the EU-US debates and the means to achieve 
it should be clearly delineated in the Agreement – notably with respect to the 
effectiveness of the exercise of one’s rights and the means of assistance to provide 
to data subjects. This objective is even more important in the context of cooperation 
in criminal matters, since the rights of the data subjects are more limited. In practice, 
National Data Protection Authorities should be involved, being the interfaces between 
the data subjects and the foreign authority requested to provide access, rectification 
                                                
4 To quote one,  in the Uruguayan data protection system, the Data Protection Authority has been created as a 
body dependent on AGESIC (Agencia para el Desarollo del Gobierno de Gestion Electronica y la Societad de la 
Informacion y del conocimiento) which in turn depends on the Presidency of the Republic.  When applying the 
WP12 requirement of independence, the Working Party 29 have taken in consideration a series of other 
guarantees and concluded that these last came to satisfy the independence requirement and this, in spite of the 
structural link between AGESIC (and the Presidency) and the DPA. See Opinion 6/2010 of the Working Party 29 
on the level of protection of personal data in the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, 12 October 2010. 
or opposition. This would allow “indirect” access/rectifications rights when necessary. 
The possibility to request assistance from the DPA of a data subject (meaning the 
DPA on the basis of one’s nationality or place of residence) in the exercise of his/her 
rights should reduce the practical barriers involved by transfers toward the other side 
of the Atlantic. I mainly refer to problems such as language skills, lack of knowledge 
of the foreign system, prohibitive cost in case of recourse to a lawyer… 
In brief, strengthening cooperation between Data protection supervisory bodies 
of both sides of the Atlantic is the necessary corollary to the strengthening of 
police and judicial cooperation of national authorities for law enforcement 
purposes. 
 
c) Providing appropriate redress 
 
In this respect, the Working Party 29 states that “This is a key element which must 
involve a system of independent adjudication or arbitration which allows 
compensation to be paid and sanctions imposed where appropriate.” 
 
The EU-US HLCG Report has duly raised attention to the discrepancies between the 
European and American legal systems in providing redress, especially as regards the 
non-availability of civil remedies for non-US persons. The right to redress, under the 
US system, is limited at two levels. First, only “US persons” are entitled to launch a 
redress action under the US Privacy Act5, excluding by thus aliens. Second, the 
admissibility of a civil action is subject to two conditions: the agency’s behaviour must 
prove to have produced an adverse effect on the individual6, and the agency must 
have acted “in a manner which was intentional or wilful”7. The current limitations to 
redress actions cannot be considered to comply with the European enforcement 
mechanisms objectives.  
 
It is quite surprising that the EU-US HLCG foremost focussed on the redress 
mechanisms as an “outstanding issue”, and that it did not in the same way on the 
scope of protection of the Privacy Act in itself. The applicability of the Act is limited to 
information pertaining to US persons and hold by government agencies. Beyond the 
limitations to the right to redress, it is the lack of protection of personal data 
regarding non-US persons and the lack of subsequent judicial review of 
violations of this Act as a whole, which are at stake.  
 
Actually, EU and US have developed different approaches concerning supervision. 
Els De Busser’s insightful analysis of data protection in EU and US criminal 
cooperation has found that “where the EU ensures a supervision that is organized 
prior to the gathering of data, the US emphasizes the excluding of evidence after it 
has been gathered.”8 On the European side, the exceptions to the data protection 
principles need to be legal and necessary, as it is the case for the exceptions to the 
right to private life of Article 8 of the ECHR. This implies that, on a national level, 
supervision should be organized in order to ensure the legitimacy of gathering 
personal data or breaching privacy. The independence of this supervision has been 
                                                
5 Privacy Act of 1974, (a)(2): “the term ''individual'' means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” 
6 Privacy Act of 1974, (g)(1)(D) 
7 Privacy Act of 1974, (g)(4) 
8 DE BUSSER Els, Data Protection in EU and US Criminal Cooperation, Maklu, Antwerpen, 2009, p. 302 
highlighted as a requirement in ECHR’s case law. On the contrary, in the US data 
protection regime, the many exceptions to the warrant requirement (mainly deriving 
form the US Patriot Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) and the 
increasing competences of administrative authorities make the judiciary the ultimate 
guarantor of privacy rights. In criminal proceedings especially, it appears that “the 
supervision of the data protection rules is first and foremost awarded to the 
exclusionary rule”9, which consists in the suppression of evidence gathered in 
violation of the requirements of data protection by means of pre-trial motion. Since 
supervision mostly rests on the courts, it is even more important to ensure that the 
right to judicial review, as firmly laid down in the ECHR and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, is guaranteed to anyone under the US system.  
 
These discrepancies supports the need to put in place strong assistance 
mechanisms at the level of the DPAs, since the effective exercise of one’s rights 
could primarily be guaranteed at this level, the judiciary being the ultimate level of 
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9 Ibidem, p. 292 
